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Abstract 
 
Recent cross-country research shows that there is a causal relationship between foreign direct 
investment and quality of institutions. The literature on cross-country studies has been 
criticized because differences in legal systems and other institutions across countries are 
difficult to control for. An in-depth case study of a particular country‟s experience can 
provide a useful complement to cross-country regressions. Using the unique dataset from 
provincial competitiveness survey and a rising foreign direct investment from joining the 
World Trade Organization, I find that variations in economic institutions across provinces in 
Vietnam can be explained by the flow of foreign investment. To overcome endogeneity 
problems, I use minimum distance from each province to main economic centres as an 
instrument for proxy of trade liberalization agreement. The instrumental variable approach 
shows that the direction of influence is from greater foreign investment to better institutions. 
The results hold after controlling for various additional covariates. It is also robust to various 
alternative measures of institutions. I also find that trade liberalisation agreement has greater 
short term impacts on institutional quality in the Northern provinces. 
 
JEL classification: F1, O43 
Keywords: Trade liberalization agreement, foreign investment, institutions, Vietnam 
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1. Introduction 
 
There is a growing consensus among economists that institutions are fundamental to 
determine long run economic performance (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995; Alesina 
et al., 1996; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 2002; Rodirk, 
2000a; Rodrik, 2000b; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004; Easterly and Levine, 2003; 
Dollar and Kraay, 2003; La Porta et al., 1999, 2004; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; 
Acemoglu, 2009). Trade liberalisation now affects economic performance not only through 
changes in relative prices in a mechanical way, but also through a number of institutional 
arrangements. Recent studies have attempted to figure out channels that trade openness 
affects institutional change. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) show that trade liberalisation 
associated with transfer of skill-biased technology increases the income share of the middle 
class. This increases their political power relative to the rest of the society and they impose 
checks and balances on existing institutions to protect their property rights and contracts.  
Rodrik (2000a) argues that adoption of trade liberalisation policies has often entailed the 
importation of institutions. Membership of the WTO, for example, requires the adoption of a 
certain set of institutional norms that assist improving domestic institutions.  
 
Trade liberalisation will increase the costs of excessive regulation and could lead domestic 
and foreign investors to pressure the government to improve institutions. Ades and Di Tella 
(1999) and Treisman (2000) find that trade openness associates negatively with corruption to 
a significant degree. Trade liberalisation could have a stronger effect on growth in countries 
with bad institutions since it could both encourage regulatory reform and lead to more 
specialization. Other recent work highlights the importance of “sound institutions” in 
promoting efficient resource allocation. This reduces the general costs of doing business, 
enhances the efficiency of resource allocation (Beck and Levine, 2004) and strengthens an 
economy‟s performance (Acemoglu et al., 2005). Trade liberalisation is associated with 
changes in the government‟s relationship with the private sector and with the rest of the 
world. Trade liberalisation sets new rules and expectations regarding how these policy 
choices are made and implemented, and establishes new constraints and opportunities for 
economic policy (Bates and Krueger 1993). 
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Islam and Montenegro (2002) argue that the more open economy is the better institutions and 
faster economic growth because rent seeking and corruption is harder when there is 
competition among agents. As the number of trading partner increases, better institutions are 
demanded to manage risk that comes from trading with unknown partners. Greater risk and 
greater opportunities work together to break the effectiveness of existing networks and rules, 
creating demand for more effective institutions. Moreover, agents in open economies learn 
from those in other economies and these forces work to improve institutional quality.  
 
While trade liberalisation does seem to be associated with better institutions in a cross-section 
of countries, various studies have shown that liberalisation has been no guarantee of 
continued institutional improvement. The growth benefit of trade liberalisation is evident 
only when combined with complementary reforms in education, regulatory environment and 
other institutions (Bolaky and Freund, 2004). Not surprisingly, then, some researchers 
question a simple positive relationship between trade openness and institutional development. 
In general, they believes that trade liberalisation has a positive impact on growth, but the 
positive direction of the impact is conditional, and incentives created by price reforms such as 
in external trade and taxation will not work in the absence of appropriate institutions. A well-
known example is Rodrik (2003), who argues that the empirical relationship between 
openness and institutional development is uncertain. Imported institutions can be ill-suited or 
counterproductive and successful institutional reform requires an adequate combination of 
imported blueprints and local flavour. Do and Levchenko (2009) point out that trade 
liberalisation contributes to concentration of political power in the hands of groups that were 
interested in setting up or perpetuating bad institutions. In other studies, scholars show that 
argue that the economic integration on corruption in host countries depend on the host's 
underlying political and economic environments. Economic integration that allows higher 
rents which could possibly be shared between investors and government officials, associating 
with weak institutions to detect bribe payments, can increase the level of corruption (Pinto 
and Zhu, 2009; Zhu, 2009). 
 
Empirical literature on causal relationship between main explanatory variables and 
institutional change has employed cross-country regressions. There are many useful insights 
have been gained from this literature; however, cross-country regressions have been presently 
undesirable on two perspectives. 
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First, most cross-country analyses use measures created by an idiosyncratic weighting of 
several institutions or categories of institutions. These aggregates are often based on 
subjective perceptions, contain significant noise, are suspiciously volatile and are likely to be 
biased or contaminated by perceptions of a country‟s economic performance. Pincus (2009) 
maintains that governance indicators that rely on surveys that record the subjective 
evaluations of domestic and international businesses and citizens do not always reflect the 
fundamental situations, and averaging many different perceptions does not necessarily make 
the indicators more accurate. Moreover, it seems that there has not yet been an attempt to 
aggregate these measures into more reliable synthetic measure of institutions (Jellema and 
Roland, 2009).  
 
Second, it is generally very difficult to control for differences in cultures, legal systems and 
other institutions that may be relevant for the outcome variable under study. Using dummy or 
inclusion of fixed effects in panel regressions may help. However, the myriad of country-
specific institutions may also interact with the key regressor under investigation to affect the 
outcome variable (Wei and Wu, 2001, Malesky and Taussig, 2009). In addition, some 
institutional measure, such as quality of government, can change over short-time. In this case, 
the usual fixed effects are not sufficient to control for the influence of the country-specific 
institutions. 
 
Therefore, it is necessary to supplement cross-country studies by investigating the causal 
relationship between trade liberalization agreement and institution quality within country. In 
this context, Vietnam is likely to be appropriate test for several reasons. First, the signing 
bilateral and multilateral trade agreement offers a good occasion to assess the consequence of 
embracing globalization. Before 1990, the country had relatively small amount of foreign 
direct investment. The amount of foreign investment increased rapidly, particularly after 
Vietnam signs trade agreements and accession to the World Trade Organization in early 
2007. Second, as the central government signs bilateral and multilateral agreements with 
institutional improvements to trade and investment, all regions in Vietnam benefit. However, 
the results of institutional development have been uneven across provinces. Some provinces 
rank at high level and show rapid growth in business investment, while others lag behind. 
Diversity in initial structural conditions, such as geography and proximity to markets can 
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explain partly these differences. However, they cannot explain substantial differences in 
ranking score between provinces with similar conditions. This variation across space provides 
a good opportunity to study the impact of openness on institutions while holding historical, 
cultural, political system and government structure and a host of other factors constant.  
 
Using the unique dataset for 63 provinces in Vietnam, I find that the variation in economic 
institutions within country is associated with trade liberalization agreement, proxied by 
disbursed foreign direct investment. To address endogeneity concern, I use distance from 
capital of each province to main economic centres as an instrument for the proxy of trade 
liberalization. In addition, to overcome the shortcoming of using subjective perception 
variables, I use some indicators on the effectiveness of provincial government that are not 
derived from the survey but reflect actual activities of local governments.  
 
The results indicate that a higher amount of disbursed foreign direct investment result in a 
better institutional quality. The instrumental variable approach suggests that the direction of 
influence is from greater flow of foreign investment to better institutions. The result holds 
after controlling for various additional covariates. It is also robust to various alternative 
measures of institutions such as business environment, human resources, corruption and pro-
activity of provincial leaders. The effect is found to be greater on provinces in the North. At 
the same time, the two measures of quality of local government show consistent prediction: 
higher foreign direct investment boost the quality of local governments. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the trade 
liberalization and foreign investment and the channels through which high foreign investment 
flows could lead to institutional changes within the country. Section 3 justifies for data used. 
Section 4 introduces the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Trade liberalization agreements, foreign investment and local governance changes 
 
Vietnam began to liberalize international trade in the late 1980s and early 1990s from a 
position as one of the poorest economies in the world. In an effort to integrate into global 
markets, Vietnam has promoted a policy towards regional integration and in this light is 
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committed to the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) in 1995, ASEAN-China FTA 
(ACFTA) in 2002, ASEAN-Korea FTA in 2006 and is negotiating a number of other bilateral 
trade agreements, such as an agreement between ASEAN and Japan, India and Australia and 
New Zealand. Vietnam‟s bilateral agreement with the US, signed in 2001 marked a major 
effort to liberalise and guarantee a stable trading environment for trade flows between the US 
and Vietnam. In early 2007, Vietnam officially became a member of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). 
 
Together with trade liberalization, the investment regimes have been gradually liberalized 
during the last several decades to attract foreign investment. Stimulated by Vietnam‟s 
impressive economic growth and the liberalization progress, the inflows of foreign direct 
investment to Vietnam have been on steady increase since the late of 1980s. Figure 5 shows 
that the amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) increases substantially following the 
bilateral trade agreement with the US and especially the membership of the WTO in earlier 
2007. The amount of registered FDI flow reached over 10 billion USD in 2006, and surged to 
over 20 billion USD in 2007 and more than 60 billion USD in 2008. 
 
FDI does not distribute evenly within the country. FDI activity has tended to cluster around a 
relatively few geographical locations and business sectors. Roughly 60% of Vietnam‟s FDI 
stock is located in Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi and Dong Nai province. Although it is not 
surprising that some of remote rural provinces have missed out on Vietnam‟s FDI inflow 
phenomenon, even big cities like Haiphong and Danang have attract less FDI activity than 
one might expect for such major urban centres (Freeman, 2002). 
 
FDI affects provincial economic activities and governance significantly. Since foreign direct 
investment are believed as the major driving force of budget revenue, economic growth and 
poverty reduction, local governments offer various preferential policies to foreign investors to 
attract more foreign investment (so called pull effects). For example, tax holidays and 
cheaper land are normal way that local governments tend to use to compete. In addition, 
provinces also lower transaction costs and improves the investment environment. With 
decentralization in the authority of investment regulation, provinces even provide foreign 
investors a variety of extra incentives beyond the ones permitted by the central government, 
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ranging from investment premiums and accelerated depreciation to tax holidays and 
reductions of land use fees (Vu et al, 2007).  
 
At the same time, provinces that attract a plenty of FDI have the resources and autonomy to 
improve both infrastructure and governance, which in turn attract more investors. The 
provinces with extra revenue can contribute their surplus to the central government and make 
them a greater opportunity to lobby power centrally. Extra revenue can also be invested back 
into infrastructure and social activities, and be used to offset provincial tax incentives 
(Malesky, 2008). Malesky (2004) believes that FDI flow may also make provinces more 
autonomy in experimenting policy reform since provinces with high FDI flow to some extent 
are insulated from central regulations. Therefore, they are freer to implement experiments and 
have room to interpret central laws in their own ways. 
 
Looking from another perspective, there are also incentives for provincial leaders in 
competing for higher flow of FDI. According to Malesky (2008), provincial officials in 
Vietnam (specifically Provincial People‟s Committee Chairman and Party Secretaries) have 
three sets of incentives: prestige and power, economic benefits for themselves and related 
family businesses, and community interests in providing employment and better living 
conditions for citizens in their provinces. Higher provincial revenue is the primary method by 
which provincial People‟s Committee officials achieve these goals. Therefore, if this extra 
revenue could be invested back into infrastructure and social welfare spending, this satisfies 
all three preferences of provincial officials. 
 
The second group of channels by which FDI affects local government is through lobbying 
provincial government leader to reform policies, which is called as a push effect (Malesky, 
2004). Provinces with institutions that facilitate interaction with foreign investor early have a 
better chance to boost investment. However, the effects of foreign investment can be 
ambiguous. On the one hand, export-oriented investors need improvements in governance to 
lower their transactions costs and facilitate the competitiveness of their products on 
international markets. One the other hand, investors who are interested in domestic market 
may actually push for more vague governance.  
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3. Model Specification 
 
To uncover the relationship between foreign direct investment and quality of local 
governments, I investigate equation of the form: 
 
iii popFDIINS   
'
070607061007 )/log(  (1) 
 
where INSi07 is a measure of institutional quality in province i in 2007, log(FDI/pop)i06-07 is 
average disbursed FDI per capita in 2006-07, and X06-07 is a vector of other control variables.  
 
We expect coefficient of foreign direct investment to be positive and statistically significant. 
However it is not straightforward to interpret it as a causal effect. There are challenges of 
endogeneity and omitted variable bias that we need to address to interpret 1 as a causal effect. 
First, endogeneity or reverse causality can lead to bias in our estimates. We argue that foreign 
investment improves institutional quality. However it is also possible that causality runs in 
the opposite direction. For instance, we are not quite sure which direction of effect comes 
from: the “pull effect” that local governments seek to improve policies to attract more foreign 
investors or investors put more effort to lobby provincial governments modify their policies, 
or “push” effects. Therefore, the direction of causality is likely to go from institutional 
changes to higher foreign direct investment. Second, some unobserved factors may affect 
both the decisions of investors and governance quality, resulting in correlation between the 
two but nothing to do with a direct causal relationship. We are arguing here that foreign 
investment improves institutional quality. However it is also possible that province specific 
unobservable factors such as history, culture, ethnic makeup, religion and geography or other 
local policies may influence both institutions and foreign direct investment. This will also 
bias our estimates. Measurement error is another concern and can lead to bias and 
inconsistency in our estimates. 
 
To address the problem of omitted variable bias and measurement error, I estimate the model 
using the two-step efficient Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) in the two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) estimation. One advantage of GMM-IV is to exploit the optimal weighting 
matrix of the orthogonality conditions to allow for efficient estimation in the presence of 
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heteroskedasticity with unknown form. Therefore, this adds efficiency gains of this estimator 
relative to the traditional IV-2SLS estimator   (Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 2003). 
 
An instrumental variable has to satisfy the twin conditions that it is (highly) correlated with 
the suspected endogenous variables but contemporaneously uncorrelated with the error term 
in the levels regression. Moreover, the instrument cannot have direct effects on the dependent 
variable. Recent studies have proposed different variables to instrument for foreign 
investment flows such as predicted exchange rate (Malesky, 2009); distance from the border 
(Jensen & Rosas, 2007); weighted average of the geographical distance between the host 
country and the richest economies in the world as an instrument for investment (Pinto and 
Zhu, 2008). 
 
To construct instrument for foreign direct investment at province level, I follow the technique 
that has been employed by Wei and Wu (2001) using log minimum distance to main 
economic centers. 
 
The basic idea is that foreign direct investment in each province is related to its geography 
(e.g. proximity to major economic centers), but its geography is unlikely to be influenced by 
its institutions. In this case, I take advantage of the special geographic features of the 
Vietnamese territory to construct an instrumental variable for province‟s openness. I observe 
that a different degree of foreign investment reflects largely a different degree of access to 
major economic centers. Provinces that are far away from economics centers are likely to 
have lower registered and disbursed FDI. FDI projects that take advantage of economic scale 
tend to be located near well-developed cosmopolitan areas such as Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh 
City (HCMC).  There are many benefits that the projects which are close to Hanoi and 
HCMC can gain. First, it is convenient to gain access to international markets as the two 
cities possess or in close proximity to the dynamic airports and seaports in the country. 
Second, it reduces the cost and complexity of domestic and international travel. Third, FDI 
projects located in or near Hanoi, HCMC and neighboring provinces, obtain positive 
agglomeration effects with investors cluster near other investors to benefit from vertical 
linkages (Vu et al, 2009). Actually, Ho Chi Minh City and its surrounding area receive more 
than two-thirds of all FDI while the Red River Delta (Hanoi and its region) receives 20 per 
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cent of the total. All in all, the country‟s two leading economic regions attract some 85 per 
cent of total disbursed foreign investment. 
 
I note that while Hanoi and Hochiminh city are the top two economic centers in Vietnam, 
they certainly do not cover all foreign direct investment (Figure 2). For provinces in the 
central region, the minimum distance from the economic center in this region may be a more 
relevant determinant for their disbursement of FDI. The biggest economic center in this area 
is Danang. 
 
With these observations in mind, I use the road distance from a province capital to either 
Hanoi, Danang or Hochiminh city, whichever is smaller, as the instrumental variable 
(together with other regressors in the main regression) for openness for that province. To be 
more precise, assume d( ip , Hanoi) [or d( ip , Hochiminh) or d( ip , Danang)] is the distance 
between province  i and Hanoi (or Hochiminh city or Danang), then, the instrumental variable 
for province k is 
 
Log( iDIST ) = min {log[d( ip , Hanoi)], log[d( ip , Hochiminh city)], log[d( ip , Danang)]} 
 
Then Hanoi, Hochiminh and Danang are dropped from the regressions as we want to avoid 
the problem of having to define the distance for any of these three cities to itself. 
 
The instrumental variable estimation method can be summarized as follows. At the first stage 
I estimate equations (2) and use the predicted values of foreign investment to estimate 
equation (1). If the instrument is valid, the IV strategy will solve the omitted variables bias 
and measurement error problems, and I can estimate the 1  parameters consistently. 
 
iii DISTpopFDILog   
'
070610706 )log()/(  (2) 
 
The bivariate correlation between the instrument and foreign investment is 0.53 which is 
statistically significant at five per cent. Figure 3 represent the relationship between economic 
integration and geographic closeness with the closer a province is to the main economic 
centres, the more inward FDI it has.  
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Potential Violations of the Exclusion Restriction 
 
A remaining econometric concern is whether the instrumental variable violates the exclusion 
restriction in the sense that distance to main economic centers has an independent impact on 
institutions beyond any effects working through FDI (conditional on other control variables).  
Many of omitted observed and unobserved deep factors such as culture, ethnicity, climate or 
local policies influencing disbursed FDI can be correlated with institutions. This has the 
potential of causing omitted variable bias. IV strategy allows us to eliminate the influence of 
these factors. Of course there are other variables which can correlate with distance and 
influence institutions. Some of the obvious ones are infrastructure, inequality, education, 
budget transfer and real GDP per capita
1
. I try to control for them as a robustness check. 
However, we can never be sure that we have adequately controlled for all the omitted factors. 
 
One mechanism through which distance might plausibly be correlated with error term is 
through education. Provinces near major economic centers have higher level of concentration 
of colleges and university and also attract more high quality labor working in the public 
sector. Glaeser et al. (2004) show that schooling positively influences institutional quality. To 
account for this, I use the average year of schooling of people working in the state sector in 
each province to control for education. 
 
Provinces far away from Hanoi, Hochiminh and Danang have less favorable infrastructure 
conditions than other provinces near three economic centers. A highly developed 
transportation network supported by airports, seaports, railroads and highways helps to 
increase accessibility and decrease the cost of transportation for investors. Therefore, 
provinces with infrastructure at the beginning of the period are likely to attract more FDI. 
However, it is also possible that initial conditions may affect the policy selection of 
provincial leaders. Leaders of provinces with a good infrastructure tend to make pro-investor 
policies, whereas leaders of province with poor infrastructure would have no such ideas 
(Shirk, 1994; Zweig, 2002; Cai and Treiman, 2005; Malesky, 2008). To account for this, I 
use the number of telephone subscribers per capita as a proxy for the effects of infrastructure. 
                                                          
1
 Percentage of ethnic minority is possible to correlate with distance to main economic centres and impacts on 
economic institutions. However, this factor is expected to indirectly affect economic institutions through quality 
of education.  
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It is open debate whether southern provinces had a special advantage in leading the reform 
agenda and attracting investment. They benefited from a southern legacy of market 
mechanism (Malesky, 2008). Before 1975, the South followed a market-oriented economy. 
When the country is unified in 1975, the central planning economy is applied in the whole 
country. Because centrally planned system is only implemented in the South for 11 years 
(between 1975 and 1986), as opposed to 32 years (1954-1986) in the northern provinces, and 
since key components of a central planning economy such as the collectivization of land and 
agriculture are never fully implemented in the South, southern provinces have a enormous 
advantage at developing streamlined economic governance after the beginning of economic 
reforms (Dinh, 2009). To capture the unique characteristics of the South and its potential 
correlation with distance to main economic centres, I control a dummy variable based on 
whether a province was located north or south of the 1954 Geneva Armistice‟s border 
declaration at the 17th Parallel. 
 
Vietnam has managed to transfer a great deal of wealth from the most developed provinces to 
the least ones over the course of the reform era. Only eleven provinces have routinely run 
fiscal surpluses in 2006-2007. Together they account for about 73 per cent of national 
revenue
2
. On the other hand, 52 provinces have been frequent recipients of fiscal transfers 
from the central government. Poor provinces in northeast, northwest and central highland 
receive a large amount of subsidies. Malesky and Taussig (2009) argue that these poorly 
endowed provinces looked to the central government for transfers, rather than exploring 
independent reform strategies or attempting to converge to the successful strategies of other 
high-flying provinces. Therefore, to control for possible correlation between distance to main 
economic centers with budget transfer, I include the average budget transfer per 100.000 
citizens over the period 2006-07. 
 
Provinces near main economic centers grow faster than others. Barro (1997) and Lipset 
(1959) agrue that institutional development associates with economic growth. In addition, 
provinces with higher economic growth tend to have a wider gap of income inequality. There 
are some evidences showing that inequality has a negative effect on institutions (Engerman 
                                                          
2
 They include QuangNinh, Hanoi, HaiPhong, VinhPhuc, HoChiMinh City, DaNang, KhanhHoa, DongNai, 
BRVT, CanTho and BinhDuong 
13 
 
and Sokoloff, 1997; Jong-sung and Khagram, 2005). I control real income per capita and 
GINI as a proxy for growth and inequality, respectively, to check robustness of the 
instrumental variable. 
 
A more serious concern is that the minimum distance to main economic centers is likely to 
have direct effects on provincial institutions through regional policy diffusion (Simmons and 
Elkin, 2004; Tiebout, 1956). Provinces can exchange ideas and replicate the model of 
economic governance from neighboring ones. It is expected that policy ideas should spread to 
neighboring provinces and should diffuse more rapidly across provinces of similar 
geography, climate and topology (Malesky, 2008). Adding the dummy variable for provinces 
in the North and South partly captures this effect. To further investigate this potential direct 
relationship, I firstly correlate minimum distance to main economic centers with economic 
governance indices of provinces in Southeast, Southcentral Coast and Red River Delta. The 
results show that only provinces in Red River Delta are statistically significant at five per 
cent. However, I first add dummy variables to control for policy diffusion in the regression 
and implement another formal test later to check sensitivity. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis of Potential Violation of Exclusion Restriction 
 
As mentioned, a valid instrument has to satisfy exclusion restriction assumption that requires 
that it impacts the dependent variable only through the endogenous variable. However, this 
assumption is not testable. In our case, if geographic closeness influences economic 
governance directly, this assumption is violated. As discussed before, there are reasons to 
believe that provinces can imitate policies from neighbours to create a cluster of provinces 
with similar policy system.  
 
In this section, I report results from the bounds approach developed by Conley, Hansen, and 
Rossi (2008) to check potential violation of the exclusion restriction assumption. The model 
can be represented in a form as: 
 
  WZXY    (1) 
  WZX           (2) 
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where Y is vector of outcome, X is vector of endogenous variable, 0)( XE  and Z is 
(excluded) instruments for endogenous variables of X, 0)( ZE . W is predetermined or 
exogenous variables. The difference in this model with normal IV setup is the term, Z, does 
not appear in equation (1). If exclusion restriction assumption holds, then  = 0 and we can 
estimate the two equations using normal GMM-2SLS regression.  
 
If exclusion restriction assumption is violated then 0 . Based on these two equations, we 
can conduct some sensitivity analysis using the prior knowledge about the magnitude of   
and check to what extent the coefficient of foreign investment is still positive within certain 
confidence interval. 
 
In our case, we have reasons to believe that even if 0 , it should be small. If we knew that 
the true value of   is 0 , we could consistently estimate   from  
 
  WXZY )(  
 
with 2SLS using Z as instruments for X. However, since we do not know 0 , we can perform 
sensitivity analysis by studying the implications of different assumptions about its values. 
Conley et al. suggest that we can assume some specific support interval ];[   for >0 and 
estimate the union of confidence intervals for   given any in that support.  
 
4. Data description 
 
The main variables that we use in this study are: economic governance and disbursed foreign 
direct investment. 
 
Economic governance variables 
 
Although the overall importance of institutions for economic development has been 
emphasised in the literature, there is less agreement on how to measure the quality of 
institutions. For cross-country studies, researchers who undertook empirical research on the 
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effects of institutions rely on several sources to measure differences in institutional quality 
across countries. Some of the institutional quality measures that have been used in the 
empirical growth literature are the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) expropriation 
risk index (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001); composite ICRG and Business 
Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI) indexes (Knack and Keefer, 1995); an index 
combining five ICRG indicators with the Sachs-Warner openness index (Hall and Jones, 
1999); the bureaucratic efficiency, political stability and institutional efficiency indexes 
composed of nine Business International (BI) indicators (Mauro, 1999); and the composite 
ICRG index and the Freedom House democracy index (Rodrik, 1999b). 
 
In this paper, data on institutions are from the Vietnam Provincial Competitiveness Index 
survey (PCI). The PCI is product of a United States Agency for International Development 
project conducted by the Vietnam Competitiveness Initiative and the Vietnam Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry to assess and rank provincial governments by their regulatory 
environments for private sector development. PCI uses a stratified random sampling strategy 
for over 7,820 private sector firms
3
. The survey asks private business a wide range of 
questions from their performance to perceptions about the support to business environment 
and pro-activity of provincial leaders. The primary output of the PCI is the Provincial 
Competitiveness Index, which ranks all provinces by their universal regulations. The main 
index has a possible range of 10-100 and is a weighted combination of ten sub-indices with 
higher values representing better regulations
4
. 
 
The goal of weighting is to ensure that PCI scores reflect private sector performance and 
therefore that the PCI relates the most policy-relevant information to provincial officials 
regarding the impact of their policies on private sector activity. Sub-Indices that have the 
largest association with private sector growth, investment, and profitability received the 
highest weight of 15%. Those where performance on indices was not strongly correlated with 
private sector development outcomes received the lowest weight class of 5%. Medium 
weights of 10% were reserved for average correlations across the three outcome variables or 
a large substantive effect on one outcome (i.e. profitability), but a minimal relationship with 
the other two (Malesky, 2007). 
                                                          
3
 The paper uses the data that is surveyed in 2008 for the perception and performance of private enterprises in 
the year 2007. 
4
 For detailed construction of the composite and sub-indices, go to the website: http://www.pcivietnam.org 
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These sub-indices, ranging from 1-10, are arranged into three factor groups. The first factor 
contains the three most strongly correlated sub-indices and two others that are generally 
concerned with post-registration policies and regulation in the provincial business 
environment. Transparency and Access to Information (measure of whether firms have access 
to the proper planning and legal documents necessary to run their businesses), Labor and 
Training (measure of the efforts by provincial authorities to promote vocational training and 
skills development for local industries and to assist in the placement of local labor), Pro-
activity of Provincial Leadership (measure of the creativity and cleverness of provinces in 
implementing central policy, designing their own initiatives for private sector development) 
and Time Costs and Regulatory Compliance (measure of how much time firms waste on 
bureaucratic compliance) indices are related to the local level policy initiatives or decisions to 
implement those policy choices. The second factor uncovers a general conception of property 
rights, including the ability to access and the security of business premises (Land Access), the 
faith firms have that provincial courts will enforce contracts (Confidence in Legal 
Institutions), and firm perceptions of the corruption of provincial officials (Informal 
Charges). These sub-indices explore formal restraints placed on the grabbing hand of 
bureaucrats. Good scores on property rights represent state retreat from intervention in the 
affairs of private firms, as opposed to the first factor, where good scores represent policy 
interventions. The final factor comprises two subindices Entry Costs and Bias to the State 
Sector, which address entry barriers to private entrepreneurs. Entry Costs describe the direct 
financial costs of entry, whereas SOE bias represents the implicit barriers to private sector 
entry posed by the economic strength of the existing state sector or the ideological 
convictions of provincial bureaucrats (Malesky, 2007). 
 
I take the change in economic governance index from year 2007 to investigate short term 
impact of foreign direct investment on ranking of local governance after one year of WTO 
membership. This index is assumed to reflect the effects of trade liberalization agreement 
through increasing foreign investment in recent years on provincial governance performance. 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the scores of PCI 2007 with foreign investment. It is 
clear that provincial economic governance in Vietnam demonstrates a high correlation with 
flow of investment. Figure 4 shows the spatial variation of institutional levels across 
provinces in 2007. On average, it shows that institutional performances are better in southern 
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provinces. In addition, the lowest rankings of economic institutions belong to mountainous 
provinces in the North. 
 
Foreign direct investment variable 
 
Our independent variable, log of annual inward FDI flows is calculated as a percentage of 
population. The data on the disbursed FDI is taken from General Statistics Offices‟ provincial 
yearbooks. In order to reduce volatility, the foreign investment is averaged over two years 
2006-07. This period is chosen because it allows looking at the impact of foreign investment 
one year before and after becoming a member of the WTO with many expected institutional 
reforms. Figure 5 indicates a dramatic increase in registered foreign direct investment from 
around 3 billion USD in 2001 to more than 21 billion USD in 2007. The disbursed FDI also 
increases significantly from 2.4 billion in 2001 to 4.6 billion in 2007.  
 
Other data on the number of telephone and real GDP per 1,000 citizens are taken from 
Vietnam's Statistical Yearbook. The data on inequality and public sector education is 
calculated from Vietnam Living Standard Survey 2006. The budget transfer per 
100,000citizens data is from the website of Ministry of Finance. The descriptive statistics of 
and the correlation matrix among explanatory variables are represented in Appendix. 
 
5. Empirical Evidence 
 
This section systematically tests whether foreign investment leads to institutional 
development. I start correlating foreign direct investment with institutions using OLS. I find 
that proxy of trade liberalization agreement impacts positively institutions. Every ten percent 
increase in foreign investment per 100,000 citizens is associated with 0.105 point increase in 
institutional index. However, the estimate is also likely to be biased and inconsistent as OLS 
does not adequately account for reverse causality, measurement error or omitted variable 
problems. 
 
To deal with these above problems, I use GMM-2SLS regression model with the instrument 
constructed. In the first stage regression, the instrument strongly predicts the provincial levels 
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of foreign investment. The F-statistics of the excluded instrument is well above 10 showing 
that the instrument is strong (Staiger and Stock, 1997). 
 
The IV estimates are reported in Table 3. All variables in the first stage are also included in 
the second stage estimation. The first column reports estimates only control for initial 
condition in 2006 and without control other variables. The estimate indicates that foreign 
capital has significant and positive effects on quality of economic governance. In other ways, 
the finding implies that more foreign capital play a larger role in promoting provincial 
economic governance or the more open to foreign production capital, the better institutional 
quality. 
 
From column (3), I use additional covariates to check robustness of exclusion conditions. I 
also control the provincial economic governance in 2005 as initial conditions. The result of a 
positive and statistically significant effect of liberalization on institutions is robust to the 
inclusion of inequality, schooling, budget transfer, real GDP per capita, South dummy and 
infrastructure variables. The results are significant as I either add one by one or 
simultaneously include all control variables. On average, ten percent increase in foreign 
investment per 100,000 citizens is associated with 0.14 – 0.17 point increase in the index of 
institutional quality. Moreover,  although I am unable to rule out the possibility that distance 
could have some independent impact on local institutions beyond its impact working through 
capital flow, the results indicate that these other effects are likely to be minor. 
 
I put the results under further scrutiny. Because the impacts of foreign investment on 
economic governance are not homogenous across provinces, I check whether our result is 
driven by any particular group of provinces. I omit provinces that may be different from the 
rest of the sample to see if this influences the results. The first row of Table 4 reports the 
result with full sample. I re-estimate the regression with two sub-samples, one for Northern 
provinces without northeast and northwest provinces and another for Southern ones. It is 
often argued that provinces in the South have economic governance better than those of the 
North due to legacy of market-orientation. The results indicate that the impacts of trade 
foreign investment more profound in the North than the South. In the fourth row, I report the 
results when provinces in northeast, central highland and northwest regions are omitted from 
the sample. Since these provinces are mountainous and poor infrastructure, they almost 
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cannot attract foreign direct investment. Therefore, the impacts of foreign investment on 
institutional quality are likely to be negligible. Since foreign direct investment mainly 
concentrates on Southeast, Red River Delta and South Central Coast, I re-estimate the model 
only with provinces in these three regions. Overall, the results remain robust to this procedure 
and support the arguments that foreign investment mainly on concentrated regions. However, 
as I only examine provinces in South Central Coast, Mekong Delta and Southeast, the 
coefficient drops significantly and becomes insignificant. One possible explanation is that 
these Southern provinces, which attract substantial investment in the past, still maintain good 
economic governance which supports private investment environment. Therefore, the impacts 
of joining WTO do not result in a significant improvement in institutional quality in the short 
term. 
To test the potential violation of exclusion restriction, I arbitrarily select several of intervals 
with   = 0.2; 0.4 and 0.6. The maximum value, 0.6, approximates to 30 per cent of the 
foreign investment coefficient in IV model. The estimated bounds are reported for 95 percent 
confidence intervals in Table 8. 
 
The results show that the estimated bounds do not vary significantly with the value of  . 
Moreover, none of the 95 percent confidence intervals contain zero. This shows strong 
evidence in favour of robust positive impacts of disbursed foreign investment on the 
economic governance. It is confirming that even if we allow for non-zero level direct 
geographic distance to affect economic governance directly and then remove this part of 
influence of the instrument, the fundamental conclusion that foreign investment improves 
institutional quality remains unchanged. Even if the most cautious case, one per cent increase 
in foreign direct investment per 100,000 citizens still increases economic governance 
substantially, by 0.012 standard points. It also indicates that regression results are robust. 
 
To look at more detail the impact of foreign investment on current level of institutional 
development, I unbundle the impact of foreign investment with different measure of 
economic governance. I correlate proxy of trade liberalization agreement index with 
subgroup measures of institutions using GMM-IV method. There are several PCI indicators 
which are likely to provide some insight into how the economic governance has been affected 
by BTA/WTO-related reforms over the last several years. Table 5 reports the results of 
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regressions estimated with different measures of institutional quality used as the dependent 
variable without controls. All other control variables are included and the results are 
represented in Table 6.  
 
The results show that foreign investment creates positive impacts on improvement of labour 
training, pro-activity of provincial leadership, private business development, confidence in 
legal institutions and reduction of informal charges. For example, ten percent increase in 
foreign investment per 100,000 citizens lead to corresponding 0.02 points increase in the 
institutional score for pro-activity of provincial leadership and 0.027 points improvement in 
private business development. High foreign investment also creates a catalyst to prevent 
corruption. On average, institutional index on informal charge rise by 0.016 points with ten 
percent increase in foreign direct investment. I also implement a separated estimation for 
provinces in the North. The results demonstrate that higher foreign investment have greater 
positive impacts on labour training. 
 
The striking feature of this institutional dataset is that it combines information about informal 
aspects of institutional setting which allows examining more accuracy the impacts of foreign 
investment on institutional quality. However, this dataset faces the problem as indicated by 
Glaeser et al. (2004) and Rodrik (2004): these indicators are likely to measure investor‟s 
perceptions rather than any of formal aspects of economic institutions. They are likely to 
represent institutional outcomes rather than economic institutions itself. In addition, Rodrik 
(2004) suggests that these perceptions are likely to result from not only the actual operation 
of the institutional environment but also from many other aspects of the economic 
environment. Therefore, to test robustness, I replicate the analysis with only hard indicators 
that are not derived from the survey and less subject to the biases of individual respondents 
across different provinces. However, I have only four out of ten hard indicators that can be 
proxies for those above indices, including: (i) share of liability/revenue of state-owned 
enterprises as proxy of SOEs bias (ii) number of locally managed vocational schools per 
10,000 citizens to measure labor policy; (iii) trade fairs held by province in previous year and 
registered for present year as a proxy for private sector development policies and (iv) 
percentage of legal case filed by private firms measuring private sector confidence in legal 
institutions. The results in Table 7 confirm our above results that only the proxy for trade fair 
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is statistically significant as I control for all variables. The results also indicate that trade 
liberalization result in better effects on labour training on Northern provinces
5
. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I demonstrate the short term impacts of international trade agreements on 
institutional quality across Vietnam‟s provinces through triggering higher foreign direct 
investment. Using data on sixty three provinces, the paper has documented a positive 
association between institution and trade openness policy. In particular, provinces that have 
had a greater amount of disbursed foreign direct investment witness a better institutional 
quality. The instrumental variable approach suggests that the direction of influence is from 
greater foreign investment flow to better institutions. The result holds after controlling for 
various additional covariates. It is also robust to various alternative measures of institutions 
and different samples. The results also show that trade liberalization agreements has greater 
institutional impacts on provinces in the North compared to the overall national performance.  
 
This paper provides a useful complement to studies based on cross-country regressions. The 
results indicate that developing country can use trade liberalization agreement as a catalyst 
for domestic institutional reform and as a promotion of convergence of institutional quality 
across regions. However, the Vietnamese experience of trade liberalization may not 
necessarily imply that the effect of openness policies on institutional quality should be the 
same in other countries. For instance, substantial increase in foreign direct investment may 
not be necessary to followed trade agreements. In addition, difference in institutions and 
government policies could matter. It would be very useful to undertake similar case studies 
for other countries to better understand the channel through which trade agreements impacts 
on institutions. 
                                                          
5
 Another concern is the response of local government is likely to result from other factors, such as policies of 
central governments rather than the effects of expected higher capital flow. I assume that in the short period of 
time, local governments suffer a common treatment from central governments and the main shock is the impacts 
of increasing flow of foreign direct investment. 
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Appendix I 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs Mean SE Min Max 
Provincial competitive Index 2007  63 53.45 7.92 36.39 72.18 
Provincial competitive Index 2005 63 52.63 7.59 36.67 76.23 
Log average foreign direct investment per 1,000 citizens 2006-07 63 -2.77 2.51 -7.61 2.34 
Log distance to main economic centers 63 4.72 1.31 0.01 6.07 
Log real average GDP per 1,000 citizens 2006-07 63 2.23 0.54 1.34 4.88 
Average Year of schooling of public sector 2006 63 12.87 0.92 10.33 15.30 
Log budget transfer per 100,000 citizens 63 6.65 0.92 3.81 8.34 
Inequality (GINI) 2006 63 0.32 0.04 0.24 0.43 
Log average telephone per 1,000 citizens 2006-07 63 -2.12 0.42 -2.9 -0.61 
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Figure 2. Regional Distribution of Disbursed Foreign Direct Investment 2006-07 
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Figure 3. Relationship between disbursed FDI and Distance to nearest economic centers 
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Table 2. Bivariate correlation 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Provincial competitive Index 2007 1       
2. Log average foreign direct investment 
per 1,000 citizens 2006-07 0.334* 1      
3. Log distance to main economic 
centers -0.498* -0.528* 1     
4. Log real average GDP per 1,000 
citizens 2006-07 0.44* 0.489* -0.308* 1    
5. Average Year of schooling of public 
sector 2006 0.315* 0.318* -0.391* 0.417* 1   
6. Log budget transfer per 100,000 
citizens 2006-2007 -0.613* -0.468* 0.502* -0.746* -0.466* 1  
7. Log average telephone per 1,000 
citizens 2006-07 0.339* 0.544* -0.34* 0.727* 0.476* -0.626* 1 
* Significant at .05 level 
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Figure 4. Ranking of Provincial Economic Governance 2007 
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Table 3. IV Regressions 
 
 OLS Estimate IV Estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Second Stage. Provincial Competitiveness Index 2008 
Log (FDI/pop) 0.922* 1.430** 1.421* 1.528* 1.201 1.741** 1.522** 1.5** 1.74*** 
 [0.465] [0.687] [0.799] [0.797] [0.788] [0.809] [0.718] [0.671] [0.611] 
F-stat 3.97 32.05 28.09 18.45 20.66 12.34 11.36 13.39 14.52 
Number obs. 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
  First Stage. Dependent variable is average foreign direct investment over population 2006-2007 
Log distance  -1.49*** -1.34*** -1.37*** -1.39*** -1.43*** -1.52*** -1.53*** -1.51*** 
  [0.341] [0.341] [0.346] [0.390] [0.382] [0.377] [0.349] [0.380] 
PCI 2006  0.042 0.014 0.017 0.02 0.019 0.013 0.016 0.005 
  [0.042] [0.043] [0.045] [0.046] [0.047] [0.047] [0.044] [0.045] 
Log GDP per 
capita 2006-07 
 
 1.330*** 1.358*** 1.455*** 1.423*** 1.331** 0.615 0.384 
   [0.360] [0.351] [0.449] [0.505] [0.520] [0.590] [0.615] 
Aver Year of 
schooling 
 2006 
 
  -0.092 -0.084 -0.075 -0.003 -0.088 -0.088 
    [0.282] [0.290] [0.294] [0.301] [0.330] [0.314] 
Aver Budget 
transfer per capital 
2006 -2007 
 
   0.099 0.139 0.161 0.446 0.487 
     [0.483] [0.474] [0.465] [0.473] [0.475] 
South       0.158 0.148 0.49 -0.193 
      [0.567] [0.574] [0.593] [0.782] 
Inequality 2006       6.976 5.159 4.15 
       [6.948] [6.404] [5.847] 
Log telephone per 
capita 2006-07 
 
      2.324* 1.888 
        [1.324] [1.338] 
RRD         0.214 
         [0.809] 
SSC         2.247*** 
         [0.812] 
SE         2.255** 
         [0.972] 
F-stat  17.98 19.07 15.69 13.09 11.41 10.47 8.7 9.13 
F test for excluded 
IVs 
 
19.152 15.425 15.531 12.652 13.947 16.161 9.078 15.781 
Stock-Yogo critical 
values: 
 5.53/16.38        
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. Robust 
standard errors to heteroskedasticity are in the square brackets.  F statistics on excluded IV for weak-instrument tests are also 
reported. The null hypothesis in this case is that the instrument is weak. Stock-Yogo critical values are the 5 percent 
significance level critical values for weak instruments tests based on, respectively, 25 percent and 10 percent maximal IV 
size. The null hypothesis of weak instruments is rejected in the case that the F statistics on excluded IV exceeds the Stock-
Yogo critical values. 
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Table 4. Institutions and foreign direct investment: Robustness to subsamples. Dependent 
variable is provincial competitiveness index 2007 
Sample coef SE N 
Full 1.736*** 0.611 60 
Only South 1.698** 0.763 31 
Only North (excluded Northeast and Northwest) 2.548*** 0.846 15 
Excluded Northeast, Northwest and Central Highland 2.290*** 0.674 41 
Only Southeast, Read River Delta and South Central Coast 3.028** 1.493 23 
Only South Central Coast and Southeast 1.142 1.209 13 
Only Southeast and Mekong Delta 1.186 1.130 18 
Only Southeast, South Central Coast and Mekong Delta 1.766** 0.827 25 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. Robust 
standard errors to heteroskedasticity. Other control variables include: provincial competitiveness index 2005, average income 
per 1,000 citizens 2006-07, public sector education, average number of telephone per 1,000 citizens 2006-07, average budget 
transfer per 100,000 citizens 2006-07 and inequality 2006, dummy variables for Red River Delta, South Central Coast and 
South East regions. 
 
 
Figure 5. FDI inflows into Vietnam during 1996-2008 
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Table 5. Trade openness policy and different institutional measures. Without control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Regulation in business environment Property rights  Accountability 
 Full Sample 
Dependent Variable Entry Cost Bias to the 
State 
Sector 
Labor 
training 
Proactivity 
of Provincial 
Leadership 
Private 
Business 
Development 
Time Costs of 
Regulatory 
Compliance 
Land Access 
and Security 
of tenure 
Confidence 
in Legal 
Institutions 
Informal 
Charges 
(corruption) 
Transparency 
of business 
information 
Log (FDI/pop) -0.036 0.04 0.290** 0.095 0.267** 0.248*** 0.031 0.224* 0.180*** 0.188* 
 [0.058] [0.044] [0.126] [0.076] [0.108] [0.076] [0.051] [0.120] [0.054] [0.099] 
F-stat 1.65 22.99 15.94 48.52 20.67 8.15 15.23 1.66 7.43 9.38 
Number obs. 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
F test of excluded IV 31.321 28.181 16.611 24.584 24.456 31.99 28.233 24.408 28.092 26.851 
 Only North provinces  
Log (FDI/pop) -0.145 0.057 0.519*** 0.063 0.294* 0.268** 0.007 0.17 0.227*** 0.145 
 [0.116] [0.072] [0.178] [0.133] [0.173] [0.121] [0.072] [0.121] [0.076] [0.172] 
F-stat 1.65 4.38 9.84 22.7 9.36 3.51 4.59 0.89 5.4 2.67 
F test of excluded IV 22.462 38.201 12.616 12.347 13.38 24.305 24.014 24.792 27.543 16.236 
Number obs. 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative.  Robust standard errors are in squared brackets. F statistics 
on excluded IV for weak-instrument tests are also reported. The null hypothesis in this case is that the instrument is weak. Stock-Yogo critical values are the 5 percent 
significance level critical values for weak instruments tests based on, respectively, 25 percent and 10 percent maximal IV size (5.53/16.38). The null hypothesis of weak 
instrument is rejected in the case that the F statistics on excluded IV exceeds the Stock-Yogo critical values. 
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Table 6. Foreign investment and different institutional measures. Adding control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Regulation in business environment Property rights Accountability 
 Full Sample 
Dependent Variable Entry Cost Bias to the 
State 
Sector 
Labor 
training 
Proactivity 
of Provincial 
Leadership 
Private 
Business 
Development 
Time Costs of 
Regulatory 
Compliance 
Land Access 
and Security 
of tenure 
Confidence 
in Legal 
Institutions 
Informal 
Charges 
(corruption) 
Transparency 
of business 
information 
Log (FDI/pop) 0.001 0.074 0.229* 0.219** 0.271*** 0.007 0.023 0.404** 0.157*** 0.148 
 [0.088] [0.055] [0.124] [0.092] [0.098] [0.111] [0.056] [0.171] [0.060] [0.136] 
F-stat 1.63 6.26 11.68 11.11 14.65 7.58 10.57 1.77 3.3 4.91 
F stat for excluded IV 17.794 17.085 12.048 17.044 17.379 16.682 17.29 13.803 16.425 17.668 
Number obs. 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
 Only Northern provinces 
Log (FDI/pop) -0.097 -0.028 0.444** 0.069 0.202* -0.152 0.039 0.171 0.074 -0.165 
 [0.127] [0.089] [0.202] [0.151] [0.105] [0.160] [0.075] [0.175] [0.057] [0.166] 
F-stat 1 1.04 3.31 5.87 11.36 7.07 5.37 0.55 8.38 6.61 
F stat for excluded IV 14.693 13.542 8.142 12.281 12.522 15.618 15.274 19.28 15.322 11.015 
Number obs. 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. Robust standard errors are in squared brackets. Other 
control variables include: subgroup indices 2005, average income per 1,000 citizens 2006-07, public sector education, average number of telephone per 1,000 citizens 2006-
07, average budget transfer per 100,000 citizens 2006-07 and inequality 2006, dummy variables for Red River Delta, South Central Coast and South East regions. F statistics 
on excluded IV for weak-instrument tests are also reported. The null hypothesis in this case is that the instrument is weak. Stock-Yogo critical values are the 5 percent 
significance level critical values for weak instruments tests based on, respectively, 25 percent and 10 percent maximal IV size (5.53/16.38). The null hypothesis of weak 
instrument is rejected in the case that the F statistics on excluded IV exceeds the Stock-Yogo critical values. 
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Table 7. Foreign investment and different institutional measures. Hard indicators 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Full Sample without controls 
Dependent Variable SOEs share of 
liability/revenue 
Trade fair Vocational 
Training 
Cases of non-state 
entities filed by 
courts 
Log (FDI/pop)  0.034 0.112** 0.061 0.084 
 [0.027] [0.045] [0.044] [0.078] 
F-stat 6.84 2.96 16.75 3.36 
F statistics for excluded IV 27.858 30.005 22.493 25.97 
Number obs. 60 60 60 60 
 Full Sample with other controls 
Log (FDI/pop)  0.017 0.115* 0.061 0.136 
 [0.020] [0.060] [0.055] [0.083] 
F-stat 9.23 1.1 6.51 1.43 
F statistics for excluded IV 15.549 17.502 13.93 22.839 
Number obs. 60 60 60 60 
 Only Northern provinces with other controls 
Log (FDI/pop)  0.032 0.258*** 0.231* 0.046 
 [0.021] [0.095] [0.133] [0.128] 
F-stat 7.92 2.05 1.79 17.2 
F statistics for excluded IV 17.21 18.639 7.903 20.606 
Number obs. 29 29 29 29 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided 
alternative.  Robust standard errors are in squared brackets. Other control variables include: subgroup indices 
2005, average income per 1,000 citizens 2006-07, public sector education, average number of telephone per 
1,000 citizens 2006-07, average budget transfer per 100,000 citizens 2006-07 and inequality 2006, dummy 
variables for Red River Delta, South Central Coast and South East regions. F statistics on excluded IV for weak-
instrument tests are also reported. The null hypothesis in this case is that the instrument is weak. Stock-Yogo 
critical values are the 5 percent significance level critical values for weak instruments tests based on, 
respectively, 25 percent and 10 percent maximal IV size (5.53/16.38). The null hypothesis of weak instrument is 
rejected in the case that the F statistics on excluded IV exceeds the Stock-Yogo critical values. 
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Table 8. Bounds for the effect of geographic closeness on economic governance 
 
Support interval for  
possible  values of   
95% confidence interval 
 Lower Upper 
  [-0.2, +0.2] 1.33 3.74 
  [-0.4, +0.4] 1.26 3.85 
  [-0.6, +0.6] 1.19 3.95 
Notes: (1) Other control variables include:  provincial competitiveness index 2005, average income per 1,000 
citizens 2006-07, public sector education 2006, average number of telephone per 1,000 citizens 2006-07, 
average budget transfer per 100,000 citizens in 2006-07 and inequality 2006. 
           (2) Bounds are estimated using the approach by Conley et al.(2008) 
           (3) Number of observations: 60  
 
      Table 9. Regional policy diffusion: Bivariate correlation between the institutional 
index 2007 and minimum distance within regions 
 Log minimum distance to main economic centres 
Provinces in Southeast region -0.632 
Provinces in South Central Coast region -0.463 
Provinces in Red River Delta region -0.839* 
*Significant at level 0.05 
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Appendix II. Data sources 
Log Real GDP: Log of provincial real average GDP per capita in 2006-2007 per 1,000 
citizens. Source: GSO (2009)  
Log average foreign direct investmen: Log of provincial average disbursed foreign direct 
investment per 1,000 citizens in 2006-2007. Source: GSO (2009)  
Schooling: Average year of schooling of public sector, calculated from Vietnam Household 
Living Standard Survey 2006. Source: GSO 
Budget transfer: Log average budget transfer per 100,000 citizens in 2006-2007, calculated 
from data at Ministry of Finance, www.mof.gov.vn. 
Inequality: GINI coefficient. Source: Author calculation from Vietnam Household Living 
Standard Survey 2006 
South: Dummy variable for provinces in the south of 17
th
 parallel. Source: Author‟s 
calculation 
Log telephone: Log of provincial average telephone per 1,000 citizens in 2006-2007. Source: 
GSO (2009)  
Distance to main economic centers: Distance from centers of each province to nearest main 
trading centers (Hanoi, Danang or HCM) by road. Source: Author‟s own calculation.  
Provincial Economic Institutions: Ranking of economic governance in Vietnam‟s 63 
provinces by the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Vietnam Competitiveness 
Initiative (PCI Survey 2006 and 2008). Data is from the Provincial Competiveness Survey 
available at www.pcivietnam.org 
Entry Costs: A measure of: i) the time it takes a firm to register and acquire land; ii) the time 
to receive all the necessary licenses needed to start a business; iii) the number of licenses 
required to operate a business; and iv) the perceived degree of difficulty to obtain all 
licenses/permits. Source: PCI Survey 2006 and 2008. 
Land Access and Security of Tenure: A measure combining two dimensions of the land 
problems confronting entrepreneurs: how easy it is to access land and the security of tenure 
once land is acquired. Source: PCI Survey 2006 and 2008. 
Transparency and Access to Information: A measure of whether firms have access to the 
proper planning and legal documents necessary to run their businesses, whether those 
documents are equitably available, whether new policies and laws are communicated to firms 
and predictably implemented, and the business utility of the provincial webpage. Source: PCI 
Survey 2006 and 2008. 
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Time Costs and Regulatory Compliance: A measure of how much time firms waste on 
bureaucratic compliance, as well as how often and for how long firms must shut their 
operations down for inspections by local regulatory agencies. Source: PCI Survey 2006 and 
2008. 
Informal Charges: A measure of how much firms pay in informal charges, how much of an 
obstacle those extra fees pose for their business operations, whether payment of those extra 
fees results in expected results or „services,‟ and whether provincial officials use compliance 
with local regulations to extract rents. Source: PCI Survey 2006 and 2008. 
SOE Bias and Competition Environment: A measure focusing on the perceived bias of 
provincial governments toward state-owned enterprises, equitized firms, and other provincial 
champions in terms of incentives, policy, and access to capital. Source: PCI Survey 2006 and 
2008. 
Proactivity of Provincial Leadership: A measure of the creativity and cleverness of 
provinces in implementing central policy, designing their own initiatives for private sector 
development, and working within sometimes unclear national regulatory frameworks to assist 
and interpret in favor of local private firms. Source: PCI Survey 2006 and 2008. 
Private Sector Development Services: A measure of provincial services for private sector 
trade promotion, provision of regulatory information to firms, business partner matchmaking, 
provision of industrial zones or industrial clusters, and technological services for firms. 
Source: PCI Survey 2006 and 2008. 
Labor and Training: A measure of the efforts by provincial authorities to promote 
vocational training and skills development for local industries and to assist in the placement 
of local labor. Source: PCI Survey 2006 and 2008. 
Legal Institutions: A measure of the private sector's confidence in provincial legal 
institutions; whether firms regard provincial legal institutions as an effective vehicle for 
dispute resolution, or as an avenue for lodging appeals against corrupt official behavior. 
Source: PCI Survey 2006 and 2008. 
Appendix III. Sample 
Ha Noi, Hai Phong, Da Nang, HCMC, Can Tho, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, Quang 
Binh, Quang Tri, TT-Hue, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Dong 
Thap, An Giang, Tien Giang, Vinh Long, Ben Tre, Kien Giang, Tra Vinh, Soc Trang, Bac 
Lieu, Ca Mau, Binh Phuoc, Tay Ninh, Ninh Thuan, Long An, Quang Ninh, Hau Giang, 
BRVT, Bac Ninh, Binh Duong, Binh Thuan, Dong Nai, Ha Nam, Hai Duong, Hung Yen, 
Nam Dinh, Ninh Binh, Thai Binh, Vinh Phuc, Bac Kan, Bac Giang, Cao Bang, Dak Lak, Dak 
Nong, Dien Bien, Gia Lai, Hoa Binh, Kon Tum. 
  
 
